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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent

:

-vs-

Case No. 14069

MIGUEL GAXIOLA
Defendant-Appellant

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Miguel Gaxiola, was convicted in a criminal proceeding
of second degree murder by the court in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Miguel Gaxiola was tried and convicted by a jury of second degree
murder.

The appellant was sentenced for a term of five years to live imprisonment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by the court below
and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 18, 1975, a jury was impaneled and trial began before
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. The appellant, Miguel Gaxiola and
Isaac Leyvas were charged with first degree murder by an Information alleging
that on the 10th day of July, 1974, the defendants intentionally or knowingly caused
the death of Lalo Idilo Trujillo, and at the time of said homicide, the said
defendants were convicts under sentence of imprisonment,
Miguel Gaxiola was an inmate in the California prison system prior
to his transfer to the Utah State Prison. While incarcerated at San Quentin,
Mr. Gaxiola was a member of a prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. (980,
18-19) In July of 1973, Appellant sent a message to William Hankins, an
investigator at San Quentin (979, 11-12) and expressed a desire to make a clean
break from the mafia. (980, 18-19) Mr. Hankins testified that he realized
that if he talked to Appellant he could not go back inside the prison, (981, 1-4)
because if he did, he would be a Mdead man" . (982,7) Before bringing Appellant
out from inside the walls to his office, Mr. Hankins called Don Elder, a special
agent assigned to investigation of the Mexican Mafia, and made arrangements
for his immediate transfer.

(982,11-13)

Donald Emerson Elder testified that Mike agreed to give the California
authorities evidence of extreme value and that in return "we made a commitment
to provide for his physical and psychological safety. M (987, 20-26) He also
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testified that the authorities had agreed to provide for the safety of Mr. Gaxiola's
wife and child too. (P. 987, lines 26-30) Mr. Elder testified that Mr. Gaxiola
had been "moved in a clandestine type of manner, he was shown on our records
a s . . . going out to court..., Nobody knew where he was actually being taken,
other than 1 and the people that transported him. " (P. 986, lines 11-16)

Mr.

Gaxiola was taken to the city jail in Monterey Park and booked under an alias
and that they moved his wife that night "because of the communications that
this group has and the fear that we had that somebody might move on her in
retaliation..." (P. 988, lines 9-13) Appellant was subsequently transferred
numerous times for his security. (P. 989, 16-17) The witness testified that
Mr. Gaxiola "understood that when he left this group and... gave us information
that he was certain to be killed" (990, 13-15) He testified that Mr. Gaxiola's
life was certainly in danger (995, 2) and that this opinion is based on knowledge
I gained through my investigation into the prison gangs and the Mexican Mafia
and the way they operate. "When a man turns informant against one of these
groups, expecially if he is a member, it's an automatic death contract on the
man and whether it takes them three days to fill that contract or whether
it takes 30 years to fill the contract when the opportunity arises that they carry
out the kill on their man, they willcarryit out. " (P. 994, lines 11-18) Mr. Elder
further testified that Mike was transferred with another inmate who knew of his
situation and that there is communication between prisons within the Mexican
Mafia. (P. 997-998) He also stated that on July 10, 1974, the date of the murder,
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inmates at San Quenton knew that Miguel Gaxiola was in the Utah State Prison
(998, 21-24) and that there was a death contract on Mr. Gaxiola from the Mexican
Mafia.

(999-1000)
Miguel Gaxiola arrived at the Utah State Prison on the 5th or 6th day

of March, 1974. (1057, 11-12) He had been assured that his name was to be
changed and he became aware at the time of his arrival that those arrangements
had not been made. (1058, 24-29) From the time of his arrival Appellant
was fearful for his life. (1061, line 16, 1064, lines 26-29) Appellant related
many incidents involving conflicts with inmates and situations that concerned him
greatly. (1060, 1062-1063, 1064, 1065-1066) He was convinced that inmates
would find out about him and that he would be killed (1064) either by an inmate
who didn't like informants or by someone with the mafia contract.
He tried to explain his situation to several members of the staff, but
no one took him seriously, so he called the Special Agents in California* Robert
E. Morrill, Special Agent for the city of Monterey Park testified he had several
conversations with Appellant and that he was fearful for his life.
(P. 10, line 14) Thomas Stroud, correctional counselor at Utah State Prison
testified that Appellant had asked him if his records could be locked in a
separate place and said that he felt his life might be in danger. (1026) Judith
Shephard, psychologist and Director of the Diagnostic Unit, testified that she
talked with Appellant several times and that he was upset, worried and fearful.
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(P. 1042, line 1) On cross-examination, Dr. Shephard testified that it was
her opinion that Appellant was not complaining to gain some benefit or manipulate
the system but that "from his perception, it was real. " (P. 1044, line 14) Also,
Richard Oldroyd, psychologist at the prison, testified that he had six to ten
interviews with Appellant and Appellant expressed fear for his life. (976)
The stabbing at the Utah State Prison on July 10, 1974, is a complicated
factual situation. There were approximately 100 individuals, inmates, and
guards who observed some protion of the incident which occurred over a prolonged period of time of approximately one hour and shifted from place to place
within the institution. The State called approximately 27 witnesses and Appellant
called 16 witnesses. It is most difficult to summarize the testimony but the
following witness was critical.
Joel Ammon Lindsey, correctional counselor at "B" Block at Utah State
Prison testified that on July 10, 1974, at about 2:30 p. m. he observed " a group
of inmates milling around and there was a lot of shouting and I saw one man
take a swing at another one and take a kick at him. " (P. 243, lines 7-9) Mike
Gaxiola was doing the kicking and William Pope, another inmate, was the man
that he swung at and kicked at. (P. 243, lines 18-19) He testified that he
called some officers to come down and assist with the situation and several
arrived. (P. 250, lines 19-25) "And then about that time.. .Mike Gaxiola
[came by] and he looked over at Pope and he says, 'Let's you and I go on out
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in the yard and have this thing out.f " (P. 250, lines 19-25) Mr. Lindsey further
testified that "Mike... walked on down [the hall] probably 30 feet... then he
turned around and came back. And at that time he had a stick in his hand. "
(P. 251, 2-5) "As he walked by where Pope and Lewis were standing then in the
meantime Pope and Lewis and changed positions, Pope was standing behind
Lewis, o. and Mike hit [Lewis] on the head with the stick. " (P. 251, lines 7-12)
A few minutes later, Mr. Lindsey testified he "was over opening the doors...
preparing to lock [the prisoners] in and I looked over on the bottom of those
stairways, that stairway there, and I could see Lalo Trujillo standing at
the bottom of the steps looking up the steps. [Then] I saw a broom stick come
down the stairways. " (P. 254, lines 2-15) "I walked over and looked up the stairs
to see what I could see out there. And I saw Mike Gaxiola standing up near
the top of the steps. " (P. 254, lines 20-22) Mr. Lindsey then testified that the
next thing he observed was "Mike and Lalo over here fighting" with their fists.
(P. 256, lines 5-7) "[T]he next time I looked back I could see another inmate
walking toward where these two were fighting. " (P. 256, lines 11-13) This
unnamed inmate and Lalo "exchanged at least six blows. " (P. 258, lines 4-5)
f

Then... Mike Gaxiola had a knife in his hands, in his right hand, and he had
a hold of Lalo with his left hand and he was stabbing him in the back with an
overhand motion. " (P. 258, lines 12-16) He further testified that Mike Gaxiola
looked like he had been crying and appeared to be upset and mad. (P. 283, lines
6-21)

Charles Mitchell, inmate at the Utah State Prison, testified that Pope
was a pretty good sized man (P. 410, line 3) and that earlier in the day he
had seen Pope hit Mike in the face. (P. 412, line 1) Mr. Mitchell testified
that at that time Pope "had a stick and had a white cane and a little knife. "
That Pope was pretty mad and told Mike to "Get me my shit" referring to pills.
(P. 414-415) Mr. Mitchell further testified that Mike was "trying to get out
of the way. " (P. 415, line 29) and that Pope followed Mike as he was backing
up. (P. 415, lines 25-28)
Gilbert Lee Rodriquez, inmate at the Utah State Prison who occupied
the cell next to Mike Gaxiola, testified that he saw Mike and Pope walking toward
"B" Block in the afternoon of July 10, 1974, and heard Mike tell Pope "Let's
go out to the yard. " (P. 636-637) He further testified that he told "Paul
Gardunio to go down and get the knife. " And that Paul ran down the corridor
and came back with a knife which he gave to Mike. (P. 637 -639) He testified
that Mike then walked toward "A" Block and then he came back and said "he
was going to get Pope. " (P. 640, lines 18-19) Then Mike "started walking
inside "B" Block when this Lewis was standing at the door... Mike still had
this broom handle in his hand and he hit Lewis on the side of the head with
the stick and Lewis had a belt wrapped around his hand... [w]hich he swung
at Mike a couple or few times. " (P. 640-641) "About a minute or two [later]
the whistle blew for ring in. " (P. 642, lines 20-21) This was a signal for all
prisoners to return to their cells. Mr. Rodriquez testified that he walked to
the officers cage and saw Lalo Trujillo "standing at the bottom of the stairs. "

(P. 644, lines 3-4) That

M

[h]e had a dust pan in his left hand and a broomstick

in his right hand. M (?. 544, lines 12-13) Then, Mr. Rodriquez testified,
walked in around Mr. Undsey while he was talking to
stairs.

M

I

someone up the

I walked around to look up the stairs to see who he was talking to.

I walked over by the bottom of the stairs, I walked up, took a step towards
him, and he had the broomstick and raised it as though he was going to hit
me with the stick . . .

I seen that he was going to hit me so I hit him . . .

I punched him with my right hand on the left side of his [face] . . . [He]
dropped the stick and . . .
kicked me . . .

we exchanged a few punches . . . Then he

in the crotch, which backed me up. At this time I seen

Mike Gaxiola . . .
to three times . . .

at the bottom of the stairs start stabbing Trujillo two
M

(p. 645-647)

Gilbert Rodriquez then testified that after Appellant left he observed
Isaac Leyvas "squatted over Lalo and started stabbing him. ft (650)
Robert LaSalle, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, testified that
on the afternoon of July 10, 1974, he saw William Pope, Mr. Lewis, and Appellant
talking in the main corridor, when out of the blue Pope hit Appellant in the
face, (P. 857, lines 7-9) and Lewis grabbed Appellant while Pope hit him again.
(P. 861, Lines 2-4) He testified that he left and when he returned to a different
portion of the main corridor there was a large crowd and Lalo Trujillo
threatened Appellant with a knife (P. 868, lines 13-16). Lalo stepped aside
and Pope followed Appellant down the corridor as Appellant retreated.
(872) There were subsequent altercations in the corridor. (874-878)
He testified that he observed

Appellant go into "B" Block and that he followed him. (878)
When he got to the T. V. room, Mike was there and Lalo was entering
the room. Lalo had something in his right hand and was circling toward the
center of the room. (P. 884, lines 8-28) He testified that he saw Mike
backing up and that Mike had a broomstick in his hand. (P. 885, line 14) He
then left the room and ran into the officers cage. Gilbert Rodriquez was
standing at the bottom of the stairs. "Lalo came down the steps and they started
fighting. Well not really a fight, Lalo just -- was working Gilbert over. " (P.
886, lines 7-12) "Mike came down the stairs a few seconds after Lalo and he
grabbed Lalo over the shoulder... and tried to pull Lalo off of Gilbert...
[Lalo] elbowed Mike in the side of the head throwing him off. Mike came to
his feet and pulled a knife and attacked Lalo [while Lalo] was still beating on
Gilbert."

(886-8P7)

Miguel Gixiola testified that on the 10th day of July, 1974, he was fearful
for his life and that during the incident which lasted approximately one hour
a large crowd gathered and observed and that "I didn't know who was against
me or with me or anything. " (1071) Appellant testified that the incident
started when Pope confronted him and said that he owed Pope 50 pills to repay
him for $10 Pope had loaned Appellant. At that time, Pope struck him with the
back of his hand. Someone grabbed Appellant and Pope struck him again. (1069)
The witness stated that Pope had told him that he "knew why I was transferred
and that I just tried to avoid it. " (1070) "He said, 'Go get your shit, I'm
going to kill you, punk, go get your shit.' " So Mike testified that he armed
himself and went back to confront Pope. When he got back, Lalo was at his side

saying " 'You are dead1 in Spanish. " (1070-71) At that point, Lalo "started
to pull something out of his back pocket... I backed away.,f (P. 1071-72)
The witness testified that he hit Lewis and followed he and Pope to the hospital.
"I was wondering why Lalo was in i t . . . why he was after me. And I wanted
to ask him why. I wanted to talk to him, I figured I could talk to him if we
were both alone. " (P. 1072) He testified that he followed Lalo to the T. V. room
where Lalo just came at him. (P. 1073, lines 6-13) Finally, Lalo left and
the witness looked down the stairs and saw Gilbert Rodriquez and Lalo fighting. (107^
"I grabbed Lalo and I tried to pull him off.. [but] he knocked me back some way...
I pulled out my knife and stabbed him.tT (1075) He then testified that
A big crowd came and I just ran up the stairs. M (P. 1076)
Dr. Louis G. Moench, physician specializing in psychiatry, testified
that he examined Miguel Gaxiola on December 19, 1974, and based on that
examination it was his opinion that "at the time of the alleged incident that
Mr. Gaxiola was under extreme emotional distress and reacting to the
s t r e s s . " (P. 1164, lines 18-20) He further testifed that ,T[u]sually the
ability to reason is diminished under such circumstances. A person reacts
with emotion more than with logic... I think that a person under such situations
as extreme fear might interpret things as being. For instance, if a person is
threatening one's life, a person doing the threatening often seems much larger
than life, much more violent than life. Under severe fear a person may choose
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only one or two alternatives, whereas under other conditions he might have
a whole variety of alternatives of action. " (1164-65). Dr. Moench testified
that the incident starting with Appellant being struck by Pope set off the
fear for his life that had existed since his transfer to Utah. (1173)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR SEVERENCE RESULTING IN HIS BEING DENIED
A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HIS DEFENSE WAS ANTAGONISTIC
AND INCONSISTENT WITH THAT OF CO-DEFENDANT LEYVAS.
Appellant made several motions to sever his trial from his co-defendant's.
These motions were renewed throughout the trial fcp. 5, 181, 708, 1324) and
all motions were denied by the trial court. Appellant contends that the motion
should have been granted when initially made and that as the trial developed
it became apparent that appellant was being prejudiced by the consolidation of
the trials and a mistrial should have been declared.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-6 (1953) provides:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense...
they shall be tried jointly, unless the Court, in its discretion,
on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any defendant orders
separate trials.
It is hardly necessary to examine the prudence of such a statute. As
it was stated in Parker v. United States, P. Cir. 1968, 404 F. 2d 1193, 1196,
•

.

'

.

'

'

•

•

•

•

:

i

•

cert.den. 394 U.S. 1004, 89 S. Ct. 1602, 22 L. Ed. 2d 782:
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.

-

There is a substantial public interest in this procedure. It
expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congistion
of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden
upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to
serve upon juries and avoids the necessity of recalling
witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only
once.
However, State v. Turnbow, 354 P. 2d 533, 538, 67 NM 241 (I960)
correctly holds that:
If the decision [denying severence is] based on any concern
for expediency or convenience of prosecution, these matters
are subservient to the important inquiry: Whether a separate
trial will assist or impede the proper administration of justice
and secure to the accused the rights to a fair trial.
U.S. v. Crane, 15 Cr. L. 2405 (7-11-74) (not on point on the facts) also
addressed this issue stating that "whenever there is a possibility of prejudice
to the defendant, the safest course would appear to be the traditional use of the
severence decree. " A reading of the transcript reveals that the "safest course"
was not followed in the present case.
The greatest conflict between co-defendants here was centered on the
testimony of Gilbert Rodriquez. Mr. Rodriquez was an inmate at the Utah State
Prison on July 10, 1974, the date of the incident. As the facts presented show,
he was present during the stabbing and a witness to the event in its entirety.
In fact, he was the only witness who testified that he witnessed, from beginning
to end the events of that afternoon.

He was also the only witness who corroborated

Appellant's testimony because he was present. It was essential to the defense
of Appellant that Gilbert Rodriquez' testimony be both admitted and believed by
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the jury.

Only by a reading of that testimony can it be understood why

severence in this case was so important.
Gilbert Rodriquez, was a witness for the state.

His testimony,

that Appellant came to his aid as he was attacked by the victim, Lalo
Trujillo, was not vulnerable to attack by the State since he was their witness.
However, it was vulnerable to the attack of Mr. Barber, counsel for
co-defendant Leyvas.

It was essential to Mr. Leyvas' defense that Mr.

Rodriquez be discredited because he was the only person who saw Mr.
Leyvas stab Lalo Trujillo.

Throughout a lengthy cross-examination,

Mr. Barber attacked Gilbert's credibility on every issue.

As if that were

not enough, Mr. Barber's closing arguments were devastating.

We would

like to call the Court's attention to the following statements made by
Mr. Barber during that argument:
tT

. . . there is real and substantial evidence . . . that Gilbert Rodriquez

killed Lalo Trujillo . . .

,f

(P. 1393, lines 14-16) That he turned State's

evidence . . . "as an effort to save his own skin . . . ff (P. 1393, line 25)
"Number one, Gilbert had a motive to kill Lalo Trujillo.

M

(P. 1394,

lines 5-6)
"Secondly, he had a weapon . . .

(P. 1394, line 20) "Solid, tangible

evidence that the man was armed in express conflict to his denial of that
fact . . . "

(P. 1397, lines 10-11)
If Mr. Barber couldn't convince the jury that Mr. Rodriquez

way lying,his client may have been found guilty.
the heat of passion.

Appellant was acting in

He had just been threatened by the victim and found him beating on his friend
at the bottom of the stairs. He acted out of instinct to protect Gilbert. Gilbert,
with full knowledge of this, testified to support Appellant's testimony. Since
Mr. Rodriquez' credibility as a witness was attacked, Appellant had to defend
against not only the State's ''presentation of evidence but also [that] of a skilled
defense attorney in Mr. Barber. M (708)
It is evident from the verdict that Mr. Barber was successful in his
attempt to impeach Gilbert Rodriquez since his client was acquitted. Gilbert
Rodriquez was critical to Appellant's case. Because of this, Appellant was
deprived of his right to counsel as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of the United States. The right to counsel, as it is well understood,
encompasses the right to effective counsel and that right cannot be secured
in the presence of antagonistic co-counsel.
Such was the position of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Yoshino,
439 P. 2d 666., The facts of that case were similar to the one on appeal here.
Two defendants were tried jointly and found guilty of murdering a fellow prison
inmate. Co-defendant !tRapanel moves for a separate trial on the ground that
his theory of defense differed from the theory of defense of Defendant Yoshino. "
(P. 667) The trial judge refused to grant the motion. In reversing the trial
judge's decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii state that "a joint trial was
prejudicial to Defendant Rapanal... The failure ot the trial judge to exercise
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this discretion [and grant a severance] was prejudicial error. " (669)
Appellant urges the Court to examine the evidence and grant a reversal
in this case. Not only were the theories of defense different here, they were
antagonistic resulting in undue prejudice to Appellant. Severance in this case
would have caused no extraordinary burden in cost or time to the State in light
of the manifest prejudice suffered by Appellant and the trial judge thereby
abused his discretion in not granting a severance.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
OVERRULING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
BASED ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
During his closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following
statements:
. . . The deceased had nothing to do with the background of this
defendant, had nothing to do with his existence at San Quentin,
what existed in the mind of Mike Gaxiola was a fear, and coexisting with that fear that by his own admission, by Hankins,
Elder, Lassig, Morrell, the California witnesses, will exist
the rest of his life. No one forced Mike Gaxiola to testify before
a grand jury, no one knows his motives. He has been in prison
one whole month at San Quentin when he turned on the mafia. He
did it voluntarily. He brings himself to our prison voluntarily
and now claims that because he has this background he can, with
impunity, practically kill a man in cold blood... Are we going,
as a society, permit every inmate at that prison to kill another
man because he is there for his self-protection? Or are we going
to let them attack at will and say, 'Look folks, I come to you,
I have this terrible background, I live in fear, self-imposed
fear, now I can shank at will? Now I can kill and at most, at the
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very most I can be guilty of is a lessor included offense of
manslaughter?' If that is the case, I would rather you turend him
loose because a manslaughter conviction, in this case for Mike
Gaxiola, is nothing. And it will give the inmates at the prison
the exact theory, the exact feeling that I address you that they can
kill with impunity so long as this is his background and lives in
fear of his lifeG I don't think that is the law, I don't think that
should be the law. (1409, lines 25-30-, P. 1410, lines 1-22)
Attorney for appellant waited until the prosecutor had finished his
argument and requested the Court entertain an objection to the foregoing statements.
(Po 1320, lines 1-2) The trial court refused to hear the objection at that time
and sent the jury to lunch and then to deliberate. (P. 1320, lines 7-26) After
the jury had been excused, Mr. Hill made a motion for a mistrial based on
the prejudicial effect of those comments. In the alternative Mr. Hill urged
that the jury be "instructed by the court to disregard that statement and to
follow the law as instructed by this court. " (P. 1421, lines 1-11) The trial
court ruled that the objection was not timely and thus had been waived. The
judge said that tTto bring [the jury] back over-emphasizes the point. " (P. 1421
lines 12-23)
The appellant urges this Court to grant a reversal based on the test
expressed in State v. Valdez, 30 U. 2d 54, 60, 513, P. 2d 422. In Valdez, .
the Court held that n the test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks
call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict and were they, under the circumstances
of the particular case probably influenced by those remarks. " As the facts in this
case show, this test has been met.

The first prong of the Valdez test, calling "to the attnetion of the
jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering" was violated
by the remarks "manslaughter.. .is nothing" and the reference to future
prison discipline. As to the first, the prosecution was urging the jury to
disregard the court's instructions and find him guilty of first or second degree
murder or acquit him altogether. This interpretation of the manslaughter
provision is contrary to the law as instructed. Manslaughter is not "nothing".
The second remark, a reference to a verdict of manslaughter giving
'the inmates at the prison the exact theory... that they can kill with impunity,"
can only be viewed as an attempt to persuade the jurors to consider future
prison discipline in determining their verdict. This is clearly incompetent
evidence, and prejudiced the appellant by making his trial an example for
all prison discord regardless of the mitigating factors presented.
Ihe second prong of the Valdez test, that "the jury was probably influenced
by those remarks," is evident. The jury deliberated a total of 12 and a half
hours. After nine and a half hours t hey returned for a definition of the
pharase "extreme mental and emotional distress. " It is obvious that the jury
was seriously considering manslaughter as an alternative verdict. That the
term was poorly defined, taken together with the prosecutor's clearly prejudicial remarks concerning such a verdict, it must be assumed that a different
verdict may have been reached had it not been for this misconduct. The
jury should not have been allowed to consider what a verdict of manslaughter
would have done to the disciplinary problems at the prison.
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The remark ''manslaughter . . .
the law.

is nothingMis a misstatement of

By thus urging the jury to return a verdict of not guilty as opposed

to a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, the prosecutor read the law not as
written but as he needed it to convict a man of a higher offense than the
facts indicated. This type of conduct is even more objectionable since
the prosecutor is a '"quasi-judicial officer' and, as such, it is his duty to
see that a person accused of a crime is afforded a fair trial. " State v. Huson,
73 Wash 2d 660, 440 P2d 192(1968) cited favorably in State v. Walton, 486
P2d 1118. Other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
adopted this same position.

In Berger v. U.:S., 295 U. S. 78, 99, 55 S. Ct.

629, 79 L Ed 1314, the court held that:
[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the two fold aim of which is that guilty shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor —
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
This is specifically mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Cannon 7 of that Code, Ethical Consideration #7-13 states that "the responsibility
of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict. "
The prosecution in this case made it virtually impossible for the
jury to return a verdict of manslaughter. The comments were clearly
prejudicial.

The trial court ruled however that the objection to these

remarks was not timely,\

The ruling was erroneous according to the

procedure accepted by the trial court during the trial and case law regarding
timeliness.
Appellant would like this Court to consider the timing of the objection
in light of a similar objection made earlier in the trial. Attorney for
appellant moved for a mistrial because the defenses of the two co-defendants
were inconsistent and their trials should be severed. The motion was made
after Mre Barber, attorney for co-defendant Leyvas,. whose case is not
on appeal here, had finished his opening statement. The motion was based
on those statements. The motion was denied at that time and Mr. Hill
requested that the record indicate that by his not objecting during argument
of counsel, so as not to interupt, his objection would not be waived.
The court ruled that the motion at that time was proper and timely, (p. 1810
182.) From this type of ruling so early in the procedings it must be assumed
that appellant relied on this and considered that his objection to the prosecutor's
closing argument would be timely.
Although it is a well settled principle that objections need be made
immediately so that the trial court judge be given every opportunity to correct
any errors commited by the court or any party, the objection here was
certainly timely in that it was raised while the jury was still sitting and could
have been admonished. That the court would not hear the objection and
accompaning motion for new trial until it had excused the juiy is not a factor
which should be decided adversly to appellant. This was the position taken in

State v. White, 106 P2d 508.

In that case, defendant failed to object to

the prosecutor's prejudicial comments made during closing arguments but presented the issue of misconduct in a motion for new trial. In upholding that
motion, the Supreme Court of Arizona stated at p. 510:
"We have held repeatedly that when an appeal is taken to this Court,
on the ground that an attorney was guilty of improper conduct in
the course of a trial, if no objection is made by appellant in the trial
court, the objection is waived. This, however, is required so that
the trial court may be given an opportunity of itself correcting its
error, and we think does not apply to a situation where a motion
for a correction of an error is made to the court in which it was
committed.
In explaining the White decision , the Arizona Court in State v. Evans,
356 P2d 1106, 88 Az. 364 (1960) stated at p. 1110:
The last sentence of State v. White, in speaking of a motion for a
correction of an error, T means only that an objection must be
lodged either during the final argument of opposing counsel
or at the completion of final argument.
Objection here was timely in that it met the test of Evans and White
and is within the purpose for the rule. The objection was made while the
court could correct the problem. Since the lower court here had adopted,
by its previous ruling the practice of entertaining objections after the
completion of arguments, a practice accepted by the aforementioned decisions,
its refusal to do so in this instance was extremely adverse to appellant's
rights depriving him of a fair trial- This Court is requested to reverse
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the trial court's ruling that it was not timely and consider the prejudicial
effect of the statements.
If this Court on appeal was to consider that the objection was in fact
not timely, the right to raise the issue here on appeal should not be deemed
waived, vtfiile the general rule is that the objection must be timely, exceptions
have been widely accepted. One such exception is;
11

where the case is closely balanced and there is grave doubt of
defendants guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as to contribute
materially to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results requiring
a reversal. " Pea v. Berryman, 6 Cal 2d 331, 337, 57 P2d 136.
This is similar to the test in Valdez, and the facts indicate that the
exception applies. There was grave doubt about appellant's guilt of second
degree murder. The jury was obviously considering manslaughter and
the remarks made by the prosecutor precluded this alternative.
It should also be noted that in Valdez, no objection was made to
the comments of the prosecutor and the issue was raised for the first time
in a motion for mistrial. The Utah Supreme Court held that the determination
of prejudice rests with the trial judge. By not addressing the issue of
timeliness and resting its decision on the issue of discretion, the Supreme
Court also recognized an exception in the test as presented in that case.
Since it has been shown that the comment was clearly within the
Valdez test, it should be determined that the trial court abused its discretion
and new trial should be granted.
Anything short of that will not only be a deprivation of protected
rights, but will encourage similar conduct in furture cases. A case in

point, People v. Ford, 200 P2d 867, 869, involved an appeal where the issue
of misconduct was not raised by the appellant.

The court refused to ignore

the "'oversight" and reversed the decision on those grounds.

In so ruling

the California Supreme Court held that the reviewing court's:
"unpleasant duty to hold that a prosecutor has been intentionally
guilty of prejudicial misconduct, [is] nevertheless a duty
which the reviewing court's must not overlook or shirk . . .
It has always been necessary for the courts to exercise a
restraining influence upon the conduct of over-zealous
prosecutors. In this they never have been, and probably
nefcer will be, wholly successful. But of one thing we may be
certain: it cannot be expected that misconduct, such as
we a r e considering, will be discontinued or diminished as
long as it goes unrebuked . . . It is regrettable that so
much is left for reviewing courts in the way of discouraging
•v misconduct. Fewer judgments would have to be reversed
if the trial courts were more firm in controlling the comparatively few prosecutors who need restraint. M 870-971.
It is apparent that this type of conduct should not and cannot
be tolerated especially in a case where the charge is a capital offense.
The prosecution cannot be allowed to "strike fowl blows" as the expense of
substantial, essential, and protected rights of the accused.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON MISCONDUCT OF COUNTY AND STA T E
OFFICIALS IN DISCOURAGING MATERIAL WITNESSES FROM TALKING
WITH APPELLANT'S COUNSEL.
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A motion to dismiss the information was argued before the
Honorable James Sawaya on February 11, 1975. Witnesses were called
by the defense and testified regarding attempts to interview several
material witnesses who were a] legedly present or t la d i i lformation
regarding the incident.
CI: lester Ga ] loway , a 11 :i i n i late 1 )eiiig held it I pi rotective custody at
the Salt Lake County Jail, refused to be interviewed by Raymond Shuey from
the Legal Defender's office ana reported that he had been to] d not to talk
to defense counsel although he would not disclose the source. (PP. 28-29,
transcript of the hearing of the Motion to dismiss hereinafter cited as "M".)
Mi

Shuey teisfifiul liial in ,i conversation Willi Captain Hayward, ol the ,\nli

Lake County Sheriff's office, Mr. Hayward advised Mr. Shuey "that he had
«:

i • :

*

Defender

^ ' :*

Office] : n

: •, - m,< r, s'S ()( t h e L e ^ U L .

:•

•. MJ < ;alloway

v— *-• — /

Captain Allen testified that 1 le had """'"received instruction from [Captain
Hayward] that attorneys defending the other inmates were not to have access
to Mr. Galloway. ff (M. p. 44.)

/ ./•••, .

Joel Lindsey, Custody Officer at the I lh ih State I >ris< >n on i :li lty at MBU '
Block at the time of the stabbing refused to talk to Bruce Lubeck from the

anyone but the Salt Lake County Sheriff1 s Office about [the incident]." : \ .
Officer

LIIKJSM

ivJuscd h nliscJnur I

IK

s o m c e o l l)us instruction.

Frank Hanchett, investigator at the Legal Defender's office, testified
that Lieutenant Barnhard had refused to be interviewed stating that he had

)

instructions from the County Attorney not to talk to representatives of Legal
Defenders. (M. P. 66.)
It remained impossible to determine to a certainty who was attempting
to restrict access to the witnesses but there was every indication that Captain
Hay ward had told Lindsey and other not to talk to counsel for defendants.
In a memorandum decision dated February 13, 1975, Judge Sawaya
stated that he was "frankly shocked by the attitude and spirit of non-cooperation
demonstrated by the testimony of the witnesses called by the defendants. "
While he denied the motion to dismiss, Judge Sawaya ordered MThe State and
the persons charged with the prosecution of this case to cooperate fully with
defense counsel in permitted [sic] and arranging for them to talk with and
examine all witnesses deemed necessary and relevant by the defense. I
would further urge that the office of the County Attorney take steps to see that
this attitude on the part of peace officers and prison personnel be discouraged
in the future as it certainly may become an obstacle to effective and effecient
prosecution in the future. "
Although a criminal prosecution is an adversary proceeding, it is
nevertheless a search for the"factual truth" as near as that can be accomplished. The aforcited constitutional provisions exemplify this basic assumption. Recognizing this, the courts early on recognized that a witness to a
crime is the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense and that
both sides must have an equal opportunity to interview all witnesses.
State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80A. 2d 12, 15 (1910); United States v. White,
454 F. 2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971). A corollary of this basic tenet is that when a
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prosecutor or the police instruct a witness iM ! n cooperate with a dHen'hnt
or his counsel that the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights are
violated. The benchmark case on this issue is Gregory v. United States,
369 F 2c I 1 85 (D. C. C:i i

1966) cert, denied 396 U.S. 865 (1969). (Hereinafter

cited as Gregory).
In Gregory tt le District of Coli u i ibi a CIi a lit ( "oiii: I: of Appeals speaking
through Judge Skelly Wright reversed the defendants conviction for five
separate crimes including first a i id sect;

t gi • «. - - '•

I t le Coi lit n il eel

that the prosecutor's advice to witnesses that thrv na ? u- to anyone unless
he, the prosecutor, were present ,?t denied the defendant the iair trial wlik h
"elementa 1 fain less and cit le process requires. M rhe Court noted the reason
behind its decision as follows:
It is true that the prosecutor stated he did not insiruci tiie
witnesses not to talk to defense counsel. He did admit that
he advised the witnesses not to talk to anyone unless he, the
prosecutor, were present.
. . . we know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the
right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by
effectively denying defense counsel access to the witnesses
except in his presence. Presumably the prosecutor, in
interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence
of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why
defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine,
through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about
the case and what they will testify to. In fact, Canon 39 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics makes explicit the propriety of
such conduct: t!A lawyer may properly interview any witness
or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal
action without the consent of opposing counsel or party. ,T
Canon 10 of the Code of Trial Conduct of the American Col1cge
of Trial Lawyers is an almost verbatim provision.
(360 F. 2d at 188)
The Gregory rationale was followed in lite "unusual" case; ol Coppolinc> v. Helpern , 266 I<. Supp. 930 (S.D.N. Y. 1907) which presents an example

of the fundamental character of the right involved in the instant case. Coppolino
was a Civil Rights Action under 42 U. S. C., §1983, against the Chief Medical
Examiner of New York City who had foreclosed the interviewing of an employee toxicologist by defendant's counsel in a commercial action in Florida.

Defense

counsel sought information concerning the toxicologist's examination of the
exhumed body of the alleged victim in the Florida Homicide prosecution. The
court granted a preliminary injunction against the medical examiner, enjoining
him from counseling, advising, ordering, instructing, or encouraging the
toxicologist from refusing to talk with the defense counsel. In so ruling, the
court forcefully stated:
. . . as to interviewing a prospective witness, our constitutional
notions of fair play and due process dictate that defense counsel
be free from obstruction, whether it comes from the prosecutor
in the case or from a state official or another state acting under
color of state law.
(266 F. Supp. at 930)
The Court noted further that when dealing with such fundamental notions
of due process that "good faith" on the part of the prosecutor of other government
officials "will not excuse the constitutional violation. M (266 F. Supp 936)
And, noted a further basis for the ruling in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constution as well as the Fifth Amendment.
Defendant Helpern [the Medical Examiner] by his conduct has
violated the constitutional rights of the defendant to a fair
trial and effective counsel. The right to effective counsel
embraces more than just the right to retain counsel. 'This
right to employ and be represented by counsel involves a
corollary obligation of the state not to deprive the accused
of the effective exercise of such right, by pressing the criminal

o£

proceedings either without affording him a reasonable opportunity
to secure such counsel or without affording counsel a reasonable
time in which to consult with his client, investigate the case,
secure witnesses and otherwise map out the defense. (266 F.
Supp. at 936; Citations Omitted; Emphasis Supplied). In accord
see Johnston v. N. B. C. , Inc., 356 F. Supp. 904, 910(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
A host of other cases support the Gregory -Coppolino position. A few
among them are noted below. In State v. Lerner, R. I., 308 A. 2d 324 < ll>73)
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that since under Article I, §10 of that
state's constitution which, like Article I, §12 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, gives a criminal
defendant the constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

tc ascertain what their testimony will be, before trial. Citing, State v. Papa,

that it wiu constitutional error, albeit harmless i<: km* fie defendants Motion
for Pretrial Examination of a witness who was being held in the custody of the
state. See also Anno., Accused's Right to Interview Witnesses Held in Public
Custody,

14 ALR 3d 652 (1967).
!

In State v^ Harr, W.

ie Supreme Court

of West Virginia explicitly following the Gregory case found reversable error
where as in Gregory,

I he pro'icnitm}' atlorncv "appeared to have advised certain

witnesses not to talk to defense counsel" and the trial court had denied the
defendant's pretrial motion to compel those witnesses to talk to his counsel.
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The court noted:
Reason, justice, and basic fairness, not surprise, have and
are more and more becoming to be recognized as the proper
foundation of a trial concerning one's rights. Proper adjudication
of such rights should be founded on a search for truth... In
our judgment the prosecutor's advice [to refuse to talk to defense
counsel] to these eyewitnesses frustrated that effort. [Preparation
of defense] and denied appellant a fair trial. (194 S. E. 2d at 656).
See also Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery,
39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 228 (1964) and Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest For Truth, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 179.
In California the case of Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. A pp.
2d 134, 317 P. 2d 130 (1957) anticipated the rule in Gregory. In that case,
on a petition for a writ of mandate to the Court of Appeals, the Court stated that
neither side can "monopolize witnesses" since*[witnesses are not parties,
and should not be partisans. " The court ruled that since the accused has a
right to compulsory process, that the logical corollary to this right is "the
right either personally or by attorney to ascertain what their testimony will be. "
Citing State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80 A. 12, 15 (1910), the court, in
granting the writ of mandate said:
While the right may in certain instances be subject to proper
exercise of judicial supervision (Baker v. State, Fla, 47 So. 2d
728), we do not think that the prosecution or the sheriff may order
a witness not to talk to the defendant or his counsel... of course,
Diaz [the witness] did not have to obey the order of the sheriff
but as a practical matter such an order can be, and was here "shown
to be an effective way of keeping a witness' mouth closecC Since the
order came from a person connected with the state, we are of the
opinion that a court can and should order that person to cease
interfering with defense counsel's right to interview a witness.
(317 P. 2d at 134). (Emphasis supplied). In accord State v. Gress,
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210 Kan. 850, 504 P. 2d 256, 261 (1972); i iiicl I Jnil eel States
v. Long, 449 F. 2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971).
The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice,

of the prosecutor In "counseling witnesses. "
3.1(c) A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel.
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise any
person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give
to the defense information which lie has the right to give.
Similarly, the Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial, 4.1 state:

•••..'.

Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not subject
to disclosure (Section 2. 6) and protective orders (Section 4. 4),
neither the counsel for the parties nor other prosecution oi
defense personnel shall advise persons haveing relevant material
or information (except the accused) to refrain from discussing
the case with opposing counsel or showing opposing counsel any
relevant material, nor shall they otherwise impede opposing
counsel's investigation of the case. Cf, Code of Professional
Responsibility, D.R, 7-109 (B)., •
In conclusion, Appellant submits that the law is cieax m mat state
agents may not intentionally or inadvertently indicate to witnesses that they
should not talk to or cooperate witl: I defeiise cc3ijn.se] in his investigatioi i

" • V'lii le

the court o r d e r helped alleviate the p r o b l e m , it could not c u r t the prejudicial effect
of the inordinate tin le lapse bet ween tl le incident and tl le interviews
The extent of this prejudice, as was stated in Commonwealth v. Balliro,
20V ! J, I1, M 1.UH, IIS, Muss. I*M>,S, "is wiihm i lie realn i< >f conjecture. M
The court held in Balliro that since it is impossible to determine what [the
witness1] testimony might have been or what other evidence might have been

introduced if defense counsel had had the benefit of pretrial interviews," the
burden of showing prejudice is impossible for defendant to sustain and,
therefore, should not be required.
The actions of county and state agents in this case denied Appellant
his light to a fair trial required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Appellant further contends that the
aforementioned actions of these State Agents denied him his rights to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses, the right to confrontation, and the right to
effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 12 of
the Constitution of Utah. Appellant therefore respectfully submits that the case
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT IV

THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE WAS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT
WITH THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE AS PRESENTED AND
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL.
The appellant contends that the Court erred in denying his motion for
a new trial under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §77-38-3 (1953) which
provides:
When a verdict or decision has been rendered against
a defendant the court may, upon his application, grant a new
trial in the following cases only:...
(6) When the verdict or decision is contrary to law or ;•
the evidence.

' I he standard the trial coi irt i i n 1st follow t las been set forth several
times by this Court, In State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952)
this Court stated 1 it 249 I » 2d 21 2:

'' ' " '

':''" . '

If the State's evidence is so1 inherently improbable1 as to be unworthy
of belief, so that upon objective analysis it appears that reasonable
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was guilty, the jury's verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the
State's evidence is such that reasonable minds could believe beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the verdict mus t
be sustained.
This Court said m State v, Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 764, 770
(1949):
The question of granting or denying a motion for a new trial is
a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court... This
court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court... We
do not ordinarily interfere with rulings of the trial court in either
granting or denying a motion for a new trial, and unless abuse of,
or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial judge is
quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge will be sustained.
The evidence in this case does not support a verdict of second degree
murder.

y t a k Q o d e Annotated, Section 76-5-203, (1953 as amended) provides

in pertinent part that:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree :i f,
under circumstances not amounting to murder in the first
degree or manslaughter the actor: (a) intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another; or (b) intending to cause serious
bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of another.
The other two subsections under Section 76-5-203, were not charged nor
wa s the jury instructed as to then 1.

'. •'
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Before the jury could have found Appellant guilty of second degree murder,
they would have had to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not guilty of
first degree murder or manslaughter.

The jury was instructed as to

Section 76-5-202 (1) (a) which provides:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if under
circumstances not constituting manslaughter, the actor intentionally
or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) The homicide was committed by a convict under sentence
of imprisonment.
There was no evidence produced at trial which tended to prove appellant
was not a convict under sentence of imprisonment on July 10, 1974, the day
of the stabbing. That is the only difference between Section 76-5-202,
1st degree murder as charged and Section 76-5-203 (a). Since it was not
disputed that appellant was a convict under sentence of imprisonment,
a verdict of second degree murder under Section 76-5-203(a) cannot be sustained.
There is also no basis for sustaining a verdict under Section 76-5-203(b)
since all the evidence presented during the trial indicated that the brutality
of the murder was not consistent with a finding that the actor intended only
to cause serious bodily injury the term is defined by Utah Code Annotated
Section 76-1-601 (1973) as amended, and reads as follows:
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ
or creates a substantial risk of death. ".
The autopsy report showed 10 stab wounds (p. 55ti, line 11).
It can hardly be argued that this was an act merely dangerous to human life.

More importantly, the prosecution failed to sustain its burden in
proving beyond, a reasonable doubt tl lat appe] lai it a i used tl le deatt 1 of I al o
Trujillo under circumstances not constituting manslaughter. The evidence
produced at the trial clea rly indicates that the deatl i was caused "under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,"' and mw

*

could not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt that possibility. The
testimony of witnesses for tl le state as well as the defense support tl: lis
position. Appellant would call the courts attention to tl: le testimony of
Joel Lindsey, Gilbert Rodriguez, Robert I ,aSalle, B icl lard Old royd,
William Hankins, Donald Elder

Uobm Morrill, Thomas Stroud, Judith

Shepherd and most importantly

i : Moench, the only expert offered

fo r eitl: ler side on A/ppell ant's * i-i-> OL mind at the time of the stabbing.
Nearly every witness called who had any direct contact with Appellant that
afternoon testified fit lat 1\ like appeared "'upset," ott ler witnesses testified
that Mike felt he had a good reason to be afraid for Ms life.
"• .• ;

The prosecution had made il virtually impossible for tlx 11«i

to return a finding of manslaughter. By telling the jury he would rather
they acquit 11: lan return such a verdict 11 le jury 1: lad to coi i lproi i lise. ' I 'hat
was a difficult compromise in light of the fact that appellant had admitted
to stabbing the victim under circumstances constituting self defense or
manslaughter. The jury was confused. They i c quested definition of a
term of art and got an unsatisfactory, dictionary definition of the words
-33 -

which comprise that term. They deliberated for 12 1/2 hours and came back with
a verdict which could not be supported by the law or the evidence. The court should
have granted a new trial under Section 77 -38 -3. So we respectively submit the
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
THE GIVING OF THE SO-CALLED "MIDNIGHT JURY INSTRUCTION"
IN THAT IT NEITHER SERVED TO CLARIFY THE ISSUE,
HAVING BEEN GIVEN AT SUCH AN ADVANCED STAGE OF
DELIBERATION, NOR DID IT CORRECTLY STATE THE LAW.
The jury began its deliberation on March 5, 1975, at 2:44 o'clock p. m . ,
(1422, 15-16). On March 6, 1975, at 12:10 o'clock a. m . , more than nine and
one-half hours later, the jury returned for clarification on Instruction No. 27
1-B (1426, 1-8) which read in pertinent part, "Defendant caused the death
of Lalo Idelo Trujillo under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance and for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. " Mr.
Merrill, the jury foreman, requested clarification of the term "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. " (1426, 7-8) The trial court judge initially
instructed that the jurors "use their own interpretation as to what the words.
mean... the meaning [the jurors] would ordinarily give them i n . . . common,
everyday use. " (1426, 11-16) This explanation was accepted by counsel for
both appellant and respondent and appellant contends that the Court should
have dismissed the jury after this explanation.
-34-

a meeting with counsel '\o see il there [was] an additional instruction "which
coi ild be ty ped and giw i i
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definitions of the individual words "extreme"', Mn lental" and "emotional" as
defined in the dictionaiy and read Instruction No. 2 7. \, (1 429, 1 6 20) , Appellant
excepted to the giving of this instruction on the grounds that the tei i n should
have been considered as a whole and the instruction was inappropriately given
.il f'lwf rime. (I4J4),
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On the basis of this exception, Appellant contends that the trial court
eoiiiiiiiiteil prejudicial etTur' in 11n.- giving et lliiM itmU'uu.iori eaiciinj' irreparable
injury to Appellant, The jury, in reconvening the court for clarification of the
instruction, asked the court to instruct them as to what the term "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance'eonstitutes (1427, 24-25) and that the giving
of the definitions as to individual words within that term neither clarified

term constituted.

Che jury, as evidenced by the fact that they requested the clarifi -

difficulty in reaching a verdict and were considering manslaughter as a viable

further instruction <m the grounds that it served no purpose to "further tamper
with the jury at this stage of the game. M (142,1 , 1 8 \1 9)
The term "extreme mental or en iotk >na 1 disturbs* n*
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It derives its definition not from the individual words which are contained in
that term, but from usage. While Appellant does not except to the definitions
of the individual words, the giving of these definitions served no purpose and
judging from the verdict only served to obfuscate the meaning of the term. It
is hard to imagine that the jury did not have a working knowledge of the
definitions of Mextreme,T, "mental", or "emotional. " What the jury requested
clarification on, as expressed by the foreman.(1427, 24-25) was what the term
constituted. To define those words individually could have only confused the
jury and this iseviienced by the verdict in that the definitions related to a term
which was an inegral part of the lesser included offense of manslaughter and
without a finding of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" the jury had
to return a verdict of first or second degree homicide. While it can be argued
that the verdict would have been the same without the giving of the midnight
instruction, it was prejudicial error for the court to have so instructed "so
late in the game. " The judgment should, therefore, be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, that the court below erred in not
granting Appellant's motion for severance, motion for mistrial based on
prosecutional misconduct and motion for dismissal based on interference
with counsel's right to interview witnesses, that the verdict was contrary
to the evidence, and that the court below erred in the giving of the midnight
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jury instruction, it was prejudicial error for the court to have so instructed
' so late in the game. " 1 he judgment should, therefore, be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
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